Abstract: This study explores how backgrounds of different categories of controlling owners in emerging economy influence firm performance. The legacy of pre-liberalization era of the different owner-categories, manifested through the social network and organizational routines, influence the firm performance in the post-liberalization era. The results validate our core thesis that the legacies of different categories of controlling owners influence the performance of firms. The study extends the corporate governance theory by taking a multi theoretical perspective. It has important implication for policy decisions on privatization and limits of foreign direct investment. The insights will help practicing managers in understanding ways in which owners contribute or hinder firm performance and to take necessary actions to leverage advantages and overcome hindrance.

Abstract: This study examines how a fundamental group decision-making bias (i.e., group polarization) may influence boards’ decisions about acquisition premiums. The theory explains how board discussions can induce directors to make a collective decision that amplifies their average pre-meeting position. Specifically, I suggest that when prior premiums experienced by directors would lead them to on average support a high (low) premium prior to a meeting, they tend to approve a focal premium that is even higher (lower). I also examine several key moderators of polarization. Results based on acquisitions made by Fortune 500 boards (95-06) provide strong support to the theory. This study advances a social psychological perspective on corporate governance, and explains how group processes may influence the diffusion of acquisition practices through interlock networks.

Abstract: Our study contributes to an understanding of executive career dynamics by suggesting how high levels of ingratiation experienced by CEOs as they rise to higher social status positions can lead to biased self perceptions that impair subsequent strategic decision making and eventually put their positions at risk. Our theoretical framework and supportive empirical findings indicate that CEOs ascending to higher social status positions in the corporate elite by acquiring more board appointments become increasingly attractive targets of ingratiation from colleagues. High levels of received ingratiation can increase CEOs’ overconfidence in their strategic judgment and leadership capability, which results in failure to initiate strategic change in response to poor performance, and such strategic persistence can ultimately increase the likelihood of the CEO’s dismissal.

Abstract: We study the influence of foreign institutional investors on corporate governance reform in the context of family governance in emerging economies. Using the sample of the listed Taiwanese firms, we examine the appointment of independent directors between 2002 and 2005. Our findings suggest that Taiwanese firms responded to pressure of foreign institutional investors when they are weakly controlled by the family or when a firm’s CEO has been exposed to alterative governance models through formal education in the U.S. This finding supports the argument that external pressure of foreign institutional investors is moderated by the strength of family control and the alterative cognition scheme of the key decision-maker. We discuss the implication of our research on institutional change in globalized environments.