Abstract: Extant research in psychology shows that individuals and groups are trying to deny their own finitude. Until recently, the issue received little attention from management researchers. This study investigates how the loss of a member in a top management team can impact on the collective cognitive schema. Subsequently, death salience may lead to specific defensive strategies oriented toward the extension of a symbolic existence evidenced in following investment decisions. Results from a quantitative analysis are supporting the existence of a short-lived effect of death salience on firm’s asset portfolio composition. This relation is moderated by the age of the deceased team member. This first step contributes to the understanding of the impact of existential concerns on decision makers and corporate strategy.

Abstract: This paper makes contributions to the dynamic capabilities and TMT literatures by developing a theoretical arguments and predictions about the co-evolution of firm’s dominant logic and TMT configuration. Our theory brings to the foreground the notion of firm’s dominant logic as the missing link between configuration of TMT resources and reconfiguration of the firm’s resources and capabilities. We also highlight the importance of effective orchestration of TMT resources through maintaining positive team dynamics. Our theory also captures the feedback effects of TMT configuration and orchestration functions on the ability of the CEO to reevaluate and adjust a firm’s dominant logic, which is central to firm’s strategic renewal.

Abstract: While there is a general consensus that high status individuals generally receive positive returns to their status, we propose that high-status executives will, in the longer-term, also incur negative returns to their status. We refer to these negative returns to status as the Martha effect and we theoretically examine how some of the same mechanisms that led to these executives being exalted may eventually cause such executives, and the firms that employ them, negative returns in the longer term.

Abstract: I argue that the fundamental role played by CEOs differs cross-nationally. Building on recent research indicating that managerial discretion differs systematically across countries, I theorize that, in low-discretion national environments, CEOs will tend more toward occupying a “titular figurehead” role. In contrast, CEOs in high-discretion national environments will tend more toward occupying an “unconstrained manager” role. These roles will be reflected in two distinct domains. First, CEOs in high-discretion environments will be more likely to depart office following poor firm performance. Second, CEOs in high-discretion environments will enter office at younger ages, and will show greater heterogeneity in entry age, exit age, and tenure. I use a 5-year, 15-country sample of over 700 public firms and over 1200 CEOs to test these ideas.